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FOREWORD: SYMPOSIUM ON PARLIAMENTARY
PARTICIPATION IN THE MAKING AND
OPERATION OF TREATIES
STEFAN A. RIESENFELD*
FREDERICK M. ABBOTT**
We are fortunate to bring together a preeminent group of judges,
scholars and government officials from Europe, Latin America and the
United States--each an expert on the relationship between the national
constitution and international law-to address from a comparative per-
spective the role of the parliament' in the making and operation of trea-
ties. We were motivated to convene this symposium by a problem that
affects particularly the U.S. constitutional system, that is the attachment
by the U.S. Senate of qualifications to its consent to the ratification of
treaties that purport to control their domestic effect. In our opinion, the
Senate threatens to undermine the credibility of U.S. participation in the
international legal process and to deprive U.S. citizens of their constitu-
tional rights. It ultimately threatens the creation of a more democratic
international legal system. We are not especially concerned that the legis-
lative branch in the United States is able by the passage of legislation to
modify the internal effect of treaties under the last in time doctrine.
Rather we are concerned with unicameral efforts by the Senate to appro-
priate the legislative power to itself. We are similarly alarmed by the
Senate's recent attempts to assert post-ratification control over the inter-
pretation of treaties, an activity that also threatens to undermine the in-
tegrity of the international legal system and that is not supported by the
Constitution. We hoped that the foreign participants in this enterprise
would help to illuminate for American legislators, courts and scholars
the uniqueness of the Senate's perspective on its role in the international
legal system and the potential for harm inherent in that perspective.
Our second motivation for convening this symposium was to take
note of the increasing trend toward the use of treaties as legislative in-
struments conferring rights and duties on individuals and to ask from a
* Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley; Profes-
sor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
1. In this symposium, we use the term "parliament" to refer to that organ of the nation re-
sponsible for the passage of legislation, though that organ may be constitutionally named the Parlia-
ment, Congress, National Assembly and so forth.
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comparative perspective whether a more active role for parliamentary
bodies in the treaty process is not therefore warranted. A distinction be-
tween legislative treaties ("trait6s-lois") and political treaties has long
been recognized. Yet the treaty-making power has resided principally in
the executive, with a subsidiary power of restraint vested in the parlia-
ment, largely irrespective of treaty subject matter. In the post-World
War Two era there has been a proliferation of important legislative trea-
ties that establish, for example, the rights and obligations of citizens of
the European Community, and promote respect for human rights on a
global basis. There can be little doubt that the twenty-first century will
witness an increasing role for legislative treaties in diverse areas such as
trade, environmental protection and information transfer. The question
which we hoped that our participants would address was whether the
time has come for parliamentary bodies, subject to their constitutional
limitations, to assert their primacy in legislative matters and play a more
active role in the initiation, negotiation and conclusion of treaties.
We believe that our enterprise has been successful. In this volume is
a collection of outstanding papers. We also convened a meeting of the
contributors and other invitees2 in Geneva, Switzerland in November
1991 to discuss drafts of these papers and the general topic. A transcript
of that meeting will be published by Martinus Nijhoff Publishers in a
hardbound version of this symposium. In this introduction we would like
to share some of the results of that meeting, as well as some conclusions
that may be drawn from the papers and meeting.
I. THE UNITED STATES
The papers by Professors Damrosch, Glennon, Trimble and our-
selves, as well as the first part of our meeting in Geneva, are devoted to
the role of the U.S. Senate in the making and operation of treaties. There
are two central issues on which the papers and meeting focused. The first
is the authority of the Senate to declare the non-self-executing character
of otherwise self-executing treaties with binding effect on the courts. The
second is the authority of the Senate to control the post-ratification inter-
pretation of treaties.
2. In addition to those who contributed papers, those who also attended the meeting from the
United States were David Caron, Professor of Law, U.C. Berkeley School of Law and John Crook,
Legal Adviser to the U.S. Mission, Geneva, Switzerland. Also attending from Europe were Thomas
Cottier, Associate Professor of Law, University of Neuchftel, and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Profes-
sor of Law, University of St. Gallen. As we gratefully note, all those who contributed papers were
able to attend the meeting (except Pieter van Dijk and Jack Weiss).
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A. Declarations regarding self-execution
A treaty is self-executing in the sense of creating municipally en-
forceable rights for individuals if the treaty is intended by the parties to
create such rights and if its terms are sufficiently precise to be given legal
effect by the courts, unless a written or unwritten constitution otherwise
provides. Pursuant to the rules of the Vienna Convention and customary
international law, courts will generally look to the terms of a treaty and
its context to determine whether it is self-executing. 3 The U.S. Constitu-
tion expressly provides that treaties are the supreme law of the land, and
that the President has the power to make treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate. The U.S. Senate has on recent occasions purported
to control the self-executing or non-self-executing character of treaties to
which the United States has become party by "declaring" the non-self-
executing character of the treaties, implying that these declarations are
binding on the courts. Under international law a declaration (like an un-
derstanding or interpretative statement) does not change the terms of a
treaty, but indicates a party's professed understanding of its terms. The
Senate has declared the non-self-executing character of the Torture Con-
vention 4 and, most recently, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.5 The Senate declaration with respect to the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights was adopted after our meeting and after the
papers had largely been completed, 6 but represents another case in which
a treaty that by its express terms may be understood to establish rights in
3. A treaty may be self-executing in whole or in part. See our contribution to this symposium
for a more detailed discussion of the doctrine of self-executing treaties in the United States, Stefan A.
Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of US Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Opera-
tion of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 574-78, 608-09 (1991). The non-U.S. contributions to
this symposium address the question of the self-executing character of treaties within the nations to
which the papers relate.
4. Even before its action on the Torture Convention, the Senate insisted that no self-executing
effect would be given to the Genocide Convention. The Senate resolution of ratification with respect
to the Genocide Convention included a declaration requiring the President to refrain from deposit-
ing the U.S. instrument of ratification until domestic implementing legislation had been enacted.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also reported its view that the Convention would be non-
self-executing. See id. at 626-27, 631; Lori Fisler Darnosch, The Role of the United States Senate
Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 519-
20, 522-23 (1991).
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200). See 138 CONG. REc. S47,81, 83-84 (daily ed.
Apr. 2, 1992); SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., REP. ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" Hearings on S. 478 Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Comm., 102 Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). There is fairly extensive discussion of the problem of self-execu-
tion in the written submissions accompanying the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings,
most objecting to the proposal to declare the non-self-executing character of the treaty.
6. It is briefly mentioned in a few, see, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 4, at 523.
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favor of individuals is purportedly converted into a non-self-executing
treaty. A U.S. citizen is entitled to rely in court on the rights created in
his or her favor by a self-executing treaty. The object of the Senate's
declaration of non-self-execution is to deny the citizen that right. Because
two-thirds of the members of the Senate present and voting are required
for consent to treaty ratification, thirty-four Senators have the effective
power to require the adoption of such a qualification as the price of not
obstructing the ratification process.
Professor Glennon takes the position that the Senate has the consti-
tutional authority to control the self-executing/non-self-executing char-
acter of a treaty for domestic purposes because the Senate has the express
constitutional power to grant or withhold its consent to the ratification of
a treaty. In his view, the Senate's power to control the domestic effect of
a treaty is ancillary to or implied in its express power of consent. His
view is that which has long been advocated by Professor Henkin. 7
Professor Damrosch concurs that the Senate has the constitutional
authority to control the self-executing/non-self-executing character of a
treaty. She argues, however, that the Senate should refrain from exercis-
ing this power because of its adverse affect on the creation of interna-
tional legal norms and on the rights of U.S. citizens. The Senate may
properly act to declare the non-self-executing character of a treaty when
there is a compelling reason to engage the House of Representatives in its
implementation. On the other hand, the Senate should refrain from tak-
ing steps that, for example, may serve to limit judicial scrutiny of the
actions of Executive branch officials.
We believe that the Senate lacks the constitutional authority to de-
clare the non-self-executing character of a treaty with binding effect on
U.S. courts. The Senate has the unicameral power only to consent to the
ratification of treaties, not to pass domestic legislation. A declaration is
not part of a treaty in the sense of modifying the legal obligations created
by it. A declaration is merely an expression of an interpretation or of a
policy or position. U.S. courts are bound by the Constitution to apply
treaties as the law of the land. They are not bound to apply expressions of
opinion adopted by the Senate (and concurred in by the President). The
courts must undertake their own examination of the terms and context of
each provision in a treaty to which the United States is a party and de-
cide whether it is self-executing. The treaty is law. The Senate's declara-
7. We discuss our disagreement with Professor Henkin at some length in Riesenfeld & Abbott,
supra note 3, at 590-601.
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tion is not law. The Senate does not have the power to make law outside
the treaty instrument.
We believe that the Senate and House acting together may strip a
self-executing treaty of its self-executing effect for domestic law purposes
because the Senate and House acting together have the power to legislate
under Article I of the Constitution. Thus if the Congress with the con-
currence of the President passes a resolution providing that an interna-
tional trade agreement is non-self-executing this legislative act should be
given effect. Professor Damrosch agrees with this conclusion to the ex-
tent that she suggests that the Congress may act freely in the area of
trade regulation because Congress is granted the express Article I consti-
tutional power to regulate foreign commerce.
The participation of foreign scholars at the Geneva meeting was
very helpful in clarifying the American dialogue with respect to declara-
tions regarding self-execution. Professor Frowein, for example, observed
that the question of self-execution has both an international and a munic-
ipal law component, and that states may differ on the constitutional
mechanism by which they determine to give domestic legal effect to a
treaty. According to Professor Frowein, in Germany the parliament
may, though it has done so only once, provide that a treaty is non-self-
executing with binding effect on the courts.8 Professor Riesenfeld con-
curred with Professor Frowein on these points, but noted that the situa-
tion of the German parliament is not directly analogous to the situation
regarding the U.S. Senate. The Bundestag must by consent approve the
ratification of treaties, but the Bundesrat ordinarily may only register
objection to legislation approving the ratification of treaties which in the
case cited by Professor Frowein it chose not to do.9 In the United States
8. In Germany, there are two chambers of parliament, the Bundestag and Bundesrat. The
Bundestag is the supreme legislative organ of the nation. However, the consent of the Bundesrat is
needed for certain legislation and the Bundesrat has a veto in all other cases, though the veto may be
overridden by the Bundestag. Jochen Abr. Frowein & Michael J. Hahn, The Participation of Parlia-
ment in the Treaty Process in the Federal Republic of Germany, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 361, 366
(1991). Article 59(2) of the German Constitution requires consent of the Bundestag to treaties which
regulate political relations or matters of federal legislative powers, while the Bundesrat cooperates in
such legislation in the manner as in other legislation.
9. Professor Frowein and Mr. Hahn refer to a statute whereby, upon proposal of the govern-
ment, the Bundestag consented to the ratification of the European Convention on the Law Applica-
ble to Contractual Obligation. Id. at 375. This so-called ratification law provided expressly that the
provisions of the convention have domestically no applicability. The statute was enacted with the
proviso that "the constitutional rights of the Bundesrat are observed." In our opinion this example
does not militate against our views for a number of reasons. 1) In the first place both chambers of the
German parliament agreed on the terms of the ratification law pursuant to their role in the legislative
process of ratification laws governing treaties concerning matters of federal legislation. The
Bundestag approved of the proposed wording, the Bundesrat registered no objection. GRUNDGE-
SETZ [CONSTITUTION] [GG] arts. 59(2), 77(3) (F.R.G.). 2) Apparently the treaty was not intended
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the Senate does not have the almost unicameral legislative power of the
Bundestag. It is this unicameral legislative activity of the U.S. Senate to
which Professors Riesenfeld and Abbott object. Furthermore, while each
nation may determine for itself the process by which it chooses to give
effect to treaties capable of being self-executing, the question whether or
not a particular treaty is self-executing is ultimately one of international
law.
Professor Wildhaber suggested that the difference of views between
Professors Glennon and Riesenfeld/Abbott on this issue is reminiscent of
the monist/dualist debate over the place of international law in the mu-
nicipal legal order. Professor Riesenfeld said that we were not advocating
a monist approach for the United States. He noted that under the U.S.
Constitution the Congress as a whole is free in our view to modify the
domestic effect of treaties. The problem, he observed, is of the undemo-
cratic character of unicameral action by the Senate.
Lord Templeman observed that in the United Kingdom treaties are
never given direct effect by the courts since the unwritten constitution
requires that Parliament act to incorporate treaties into domestic law
before they may be given effect by the courts. He said that nevertheless in
his view it is the courts which must decide whether treaties which have
entered into force are self-executing, and not the political branches.
The comments by Professors Frowein and Wildhaber were most
helpful by pinpointing that the Riesenfeld/Abbott objection to the Senate
declarations regarding non-self-execution relates to the undemocratic
character of the Senate's unicameral actions - particularly in light of the
power held by thirty-four Senators to obstruct a positive result - and
not to the advocacy of a strictly monist international law-domestic law
hierarchy for the United States.
As the contributions to this symposium demonstrate, nations do not
approach the question of the self-executing character of treaties for the
purposes of municipal application in a uniform manner. 10 In all of the
nations surveyed in this symposium, with the exception of the United
Kingdom, the courts may give legal effect to a self-executing treaty once
that treaty has internationally come into force for that state without ad-
to be self-executing according to its legislative history. 3) Whether under the German Constitution
the legislative bodies in their entirety could deny self-executing character to a convention that was
negotiated as self-executing concerns a subject matter distinct from the subject matter we address in
considering the unicameral actions of the U.S. Senate. According to the present state of authority,
article 25 of the German Constitution does not apply to the rule pacta sunt servanda (see Stefan
Riesenfeld, Fontes Juris Gentium, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 473, 474 (1980) (book review)).
10. On this subject see also the recent comparative study, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN Do-
MESTIC LAW (Francis Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).
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ditional action by the parliament.II In the United Kingdom, treaties may
never be given direct effect by the courts without implementing legisla-
tion by the Parliament. 12 In France and the Netherlands, parliament may
not override the terms of a treaty by enacting subsequent inconsistent
legislation,' 3 and so presumably may not interfere with its self-executing
character after entry into force. In all of the other nations surveyed in
this symposium, the parliament may enact overriding inconsistent legis-
lation, 14 and thereby modify the self-executing character of treaty provi-
sions. If the position asserted by the U.S. Senate is adopted by the
courts-and we stress that this position has never been adopted by a U.S.
court-the United States would be unique in permitting a single legisla-
tive chamber of a bicameral legislature to override the terms of a treaty
by the mechanism of a unicameral act.'5
B. Control Over Interpretation
In the mid-1980s a controversy arose between the Executive and the
Senate concerning interpretation of the ABM Treaty entered into by the
United States and Soviet Union in 1972.16 The Reagan Administration
11. In France and Switzerland, for example, a self-executing treaty itself becomes law upon
ratification and publication, following the passage by Parliament of an authorizing law (France) or
approval decree (Switzerland). See Francis Luchaire, The Participation of Parliament in the Elabo-
ration and Application of Treaties, 67 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 341, 342-44, 350 (1991); Luzius
Wildhaber, Parliamentary Participation in Treaty-Making, Report on Swiss Law, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 437, 450 (1991). In Italy, a self-executing treaty is transformed into domestic law by an "order
of execution" which accompanies the statute authorizing ratification. See Giovanni Bognetti, The
Role of the Italian Parliament in the Treaty-Making Process, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 391, 408 (1991).
12. It should be noted that Lord Templeman has in several important decisions of the House of
Lords referred to the European Convention on Human Rights (in force for the United Kingdom but
not implemented by Parliament) at least for the consistency or inconsistency with it of British com-
mon law. See Lord Templeman, Treaty-Making and the British Parliament, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
459, 469-71 (1991).
13. See Luchaire, supra note 11, at 350-52 (in France the superior rank of a treaty is condi-
tioned on its being applied by the other party(s)); Pieter van Dijk & Bahiyyih G. Tahzib, Parliamen-
tary Participation in the Treaty-Making Process of the Netherlands, 67 CH.-KENr L. REV. 413, 422
(1991).
14. See GERMAN J. BIDART CAMPOS, MANUAL DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL ARGENTINO
70-71 (1975) (a writer cited in Jos6 Maria Ruda, The Role of the Argentine Congress in the Treaty-
Making Process, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 491 (1991)); Guido F.S. Soares, The Treaty-Making
Process under the 1988 Federal Constitution of Brazil, 67 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 495, 508 (1991);
Bognetti, supra note 11, at 409; Frowein & Hahn, supra note 8, at 382. For Switzerland, at our
meeting Professor Wildhaber and others discussed that article 113(3) of the Swiss Constitution may
be understood to preclude the courts from avoiding the application of statutes adopted subsequent to
treaty ratification. In some nations this matter is not entirely free from doubt. See, e.g., supra note 9,
regarding Germany.
15. In the United Kingdom the legislative power of Parliament is concentrated in a single
chamber, i.e. the House of Commons, with the House of Lords playing a largely revising and advi-
sory role. See Templeman, supra note 12, at 459, n. 1. The U.K. Parliament acts with respect both to
general legislative matters and to legislation implementing treaties in the same manner.
16. See Phillip R. Trimble & Jack S. Weiss, The Role of the President, the Senate and Congress
1991]
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claimed that the treaty permitted the development and testing of futuris-
tic defense technologies (L e. Star Wars). Members of the Senate who had
participated in the approval of ratification of the treaty asserted their
understanding, based on Executive testimony in 1972, that the treaty did
not permit such development and testing. Senate members claimed that
the Reagan Administration was bound to interpret the treaty in conform-
ity with the explanation of it given by the Nixon Administration to the
Senate in 1972. Hearings were held in 1987 at which Abraham Sofaer,
then State Department Legal Adviser, took the position on behalf of the
Reagan Administration (and subsequently elaborated) that it would not
be bound to interpret a treaty consistent with its representations to the
Senate unless those representations were generally understood by the
Senate, were relied upon by that body in giving its consent to ratification,
and were clearly intended by the Executive as a limitation on it. 17 This
became known as the Sofaer Doctrine. In Senate testimony, Professor
Louis Henkin took the position that the President was bound as a matter
of constitutional principle to interpret a treaty consistent with the Sen-
ate's clear understanding of it based on Executive representations, even if
this meant that the treaty would have a meaning for domestic U.S. legal
purposes inconsistent with the meaning which would be ascribed to it
under international law.' s
The issue of control over treaty interpretation did not subside fol-
lowing the inconclusive ABM controversy. The Supreme Court, while
not denying its ultimate power to construe treaties for domestic pur-
poses, shortly thereafter rendered a controversial opinion in United
States v. Stuart,'9 which included dicta, voiced in an entirely different
context than the ABM controversy, which suggested that the record of
Senate consideration of a treaty may be better evidence of its meaning
than the negotiating history. The Senate has since adopted conditions in
connection with approving the ratification of the INF Treaty20 and the
CFE Treaty2' to the effect that as a matter of constitutional principle the
President is obligated to interpret a treaty in a manner consistent with an
understanding of the treaty he or she shares with the Senate.
with Respect to Arms Control Treaties Concluded by the United States, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 645,
694-97 (1991); Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 3, at 611-12.
17. See Abraham Sofaer, Treaty Interpretation: A Comment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1437 (1989).
18. See The ABM Treaty and the Constitution: Joint Hearings on S. 110 Before the U.S. Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations and the Comrm on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 90 (1987) (cited
in Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 3, at 617-18).
19. 489 U.S. 353 (1989). See discussion in Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 3, at 612-19.
20. See Trimble & Weiss, supra note 16, at 697-701.
21. See id. at 701.
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Professor Glennon contends that the President is bound to interpret
a treaty consistent with representations made in the course of the advice
and consent process. In his view, the advice and consent process would
be rendered superfluous if the Senate could not rely on the fact that the
Executive would adhere to its own expressed views as to the proper inter-
pretation of a treaty.
Professor Trimble expressed surprise that the Reagan Administra-
tion had gone so far as the Sofaer Doctrine because, in his view, as a
matter of constitutional principle the area of treaty interpretation is re-
served to the Executive in the first instance, and ultimately resides in the
courts. There is a point at which treaty interpretation is stretched beyond
justifiable limits and at this point interpretation becomes amendment.
The President may not amend a treaty without Senate consent. More-
over, the Congress has considerable influence regarding the implementa-
tion of treaties through control of the budget and appointment processes,
so that the President is not unconstrained in the interpretation process.
We generally concur in Professor Trimble's view. The President is
constitutionally mandated to execute the laws of the United States, in-
cluding the laws made by treaty. As such, in the first instance, the inter-
pretive power resides in the President. Ultimately, however, the question
of treaty interpretation is for the courts. We are particularly troubled by
the dicta in United States v. Stuart regarding the supremacy of the legis-
lative record for interpretative purposes and point in our paper to the
myriad cases in which the Supreme Court has otherwise properly stated
rules of treaty interpretation consistent with international law. We sug-
gest that when the court has occasion to reconsider the issue raised in
Stuart that it focus on its own otherwise strikingly consistent record.
The non-U.S. participants in our symposium, particularly Professors
Frowein and Wildhaber, expressed strong dissatisfaction with the idea
that a treaty may have separate meanings for international and domestic
law purposes. 22 In Germany and Switzerland, as examples, the courts
would not be bound by representations made by the executive to the par-
22. Professor Frowein remarked, for example:
seen from the German perspective, you would always start from the idea that every treaty,
as an international legal instrument binding upon the states which have become members,
is a legal rule which has one correct interpretation only .... We must also agree that the
interpretation may change across, with a certain time period elapsed. But, from a German
perspective, although you would be faced with the fact that, for instance, the federal gov-
ernment will have explained in very great detail the terms of the treaty in the internal
ratification procedure, you would never say that this in itself becomes binding on either
administrative authorities, governmental authorities or the courts. Because there is, under
German law, no possibility to make binding commands by explaining the text of a treaty.
That is, of course, quite impossible.
1991]
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liament. Professors Frowein and Wildhaber each expressed grave con-
cern that acceptance of the idea that a treaty may have independent
meanings under domestic and international law would undermine the in-
tegrity of the international legal system. With respect to treaties such as
the European Convention on Human Rights, it is important that there be
developed a consistent body of law which would not develop if national
and international courts rendered inconsistent judgments.
None of the non-U.S. participants in the symposium believe that
their parliament has the power to control the national courts' interpreta-
tion of a treaty. In France, both the ordinary and the administrative
courts have ceased applying authoritative executive treaty interpretations
to bring the judiciary into compliance with France's international treaty-
based commitment to an independent judiciary. 23 In the United King-
dom the courts do not look at the record of parliamentary debate with
respect to any question of statutory interpretation, including statutes im-
plementing treaties, but rely strictly on the text of the statute.24 This is
not to suggest that courts in the United States may not consult the record
of legislative approval of a treaty. It is rather to suggest that this record
does not control the meaning of the treaty, which meaning must rather
be determined in accordance with applicable rules of international law.
II. THE ROLE OF THE PARLIAMENT IN GENERAL
Much of our meeting in Geneva was devoted to the role of parlia-
ments outside the United States. We refer you to the participants' out-
standing papers and, of course, we make reference to them throughout
this foreword. We also call your attention to the stimulating paper by
Professor Haggenmacher which delves into the European history of the
idea of parliamentary participation in the treaty process and how this
may have influenced the American Founding Fathers. At the meeting we
also attempted to focus on the general question of the proper role for the
parliamentary body in the conclusion and operation of treaties. This pro-
cess may be segmented into three phases: the initiation and negotiation
phase during which the idea for the treaty is proposed and consultations
between the executive and parliament regarding the ultimate terms of the
treaty may take place; the conclusion phase during which the parliament
approves ratification of the treaty by the executive, and during which it
may propose that the executive qualify the nation's consent, and; the op-
23. See Luchaire, supra note 11, at 348- 49.
24. Remarks by Lord Templeman.
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eration phase during which the parliament may attempt to control the
interpretation or application of the treaty.
A. The Initiation and Negotiation Phase
In each of the countries represented in the symposium there is an
informal process in which the executive consults with the leaders of par-
liament during the initiation and consultation phase of the treaty-making
process. The degree of interaction appears to vary significantly. In Ar-
gentina25 and France, for example, there has historically been little in the
way of executive consultation, although in France, as elsewhere, the par-
liament is demanding an increasingly active role.26 It is perhaps notewor-
thy that in the case of France the executive has historically dominated
the field of foreign relations. The Italian Parliament was rarely consulted
by the executive during treaty negotiations until the 1970s. In the 1980s
the Italian Parliament began to play a very active role during the negotia-
tion phase. In Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United King-
dom and the United States there is a substantial level of consultation
with the parliament by the executive.27 In the United States there is legis-
lation which mandates congressional consultation in respect to certain
trade agreements,28 and in Switzerland there is legislation pending which
would mandate consultations with respect to treaty negotiations. 29
Despite the existence of informal consultation practices, there was a
consensus among the participants that the role of the parliament in the
initiation and negotiation phase of the treaty-making process should be
enhanced. There was some divergence of views as to how this might best
be accomplished.
Professor Bognetti observed that in Europe, and certainly in Italy,
the government has displaced the parliament as the initiator or engine of
legislation. The parliament tends to act as a brake. Professor Bognetti
agreed in principle that the parliament should play a greater role in the
treaty-making process. He noted, however, that in a system of govern-
ment in which the parliament is weak, as in Italy, enhancing the role of
the parliament will make the conclusion of treaties extremely difficult.
25. See Ruda, supra note 14, at 488.
26. See Luchaire, supra note 11, at 353-58.
27. See, e.g., Wildhaber, supra note 11, at 344-45. Professor Soares who reported on Brazil did
not discuss the issue of consultation.
28. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 3, at 637, with respect to the "fast track" approval
process.
29. See Wildhaber, supra note 11, at 445. Lord Templeman noted that in the United Kingdom
proposals with respect to European Community secondary legislation are reviewed by the Select
Committee of the House of Lords. See Templeman, supra note 12, at 476-80.
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He believes that the government must have the power to make final deci-
sions or determinations on behalf of the state.30
Lord Templeman favored a more active role for the U.K. Parlia-
ment, but he cautioned against bringing in the parliament at too early a
stage. He believes that the government properly initiates the treaty for-
mation process because the parliament is not well suited to initiation. He
suggested that the parliament is best brought actively into the treaty-
making process after a draft treaty has been prepared, so that members of
parliament will have something before them to mark up and discuss with
constituents. Without a specific proposal, parliamentary consideration
threatens to become too diffused.
Professor Cottier, who has recently been active in trade negotiations
on behalf of the Swiss government, indicated that a lack of parliamentary
input in the initial stages of trade agreement negotiation leads to consid-
erable difficulty as negotiated texts emerge. If parliament is only con-
sulted after drafts have been formulated, members are more likely to
object to the end product because their positions will not have been taken
into account. At least with respect to the Swiss experience, Professor
Cottier suggested that parliament must be brought into treaty negotia-
tions at an early stage so that support for the treaty will exist when it is
submitted by the Government for approval. He also intimated, however,
that careful thought must be given to the kind of consultation which is
sought, attempting to get agreement on the broad goals of the negotia-
tions, while at the same time avoiding immersion in the details. He felt
that there should be mechanisms where necessary for assuring confidenti-
ality. Professor Cottier observed that in times of crisis, citizens would be
far more likely to stand by a treaty which had been negotiated with broad
input and support, rather than as an executive undertaking.
Professor Wildhaber said that he was struck by the importance of
the informal processes of treaty consultation in addition to constitution-
ally or statutorily mandated formal processes. He urged mechanisms for
enhancing the informal consultation process between executive and
parliament.
Professor Luchaire expressed his great concern that treaties which
bear on areas which are the object of legislation continue to be made by
the executive. He said that one must have the creative spirit and imagina-
tion necessary to devise means for including the parliament in the pro-
cess of elaborating treaties. He distinguished law-making treaties from
30. Professor Bognetti observed that as a matter of common terminology, the executive in Eu-
rope is now called the "government", reflecting its role as the engine of the state.
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treaties of alliance or political treaties, suggesting that the question of
enhanced parliamentary participation relates to the former.
Mr. Crook said that, from the perspective of an active participant in
the treaty negotiating process, he would emphasize the complexity of the
subject matter of modem treaties, such as treaties on global warming or
arms control. He expressed the view that this makes active congressional
participation in the negotiation phase difficult and that this factor must
be considered when evaluating the appropriate role for the parliament.
Regarding the issue of complexity raised by Mr. Crook, Professor
Trimble said that, from his experience, issues which require resolution on
the policy-making level can be framed in terms which do not require
extensive technical expertise.
Mr. Hahn observed that in light of the role now played by treaties, it
is extremely unwise to attempt to exclude the parliament from the treaty-
making process because this will only encourage the parliament to seek
to overturn the results of treaty-making through subsequent statute and
the creation of obstacles to implementation. Mr. Hahn suggested that the
more important a treaty is, the more inevitable it is that the treaty-mak-
ing process must be opened up.
Professor Riesenfeld remarked that it is time to look beyond Presi-
dent Washington's initial unfortunate treaty consultation experience with
the Senate - "It's time that grass covers over that relic." However,
granting a few powerful Senators the right to control the treaty-making
process is also undemocratic. It is time to consider a more modem ap-
proach to the treaty-making process.
Professor Damrosch noted the importance of our discussion to the
countries of the former Soviet Union which have no meaningful history
of parliamentary participation in treaty-making. She proposed that we
focus our attention on assisting the countries of the former Soviet Union
in devising effective mechanisms for parliamentary participation in the
treaty-making process.
There is an evident range to the proposals by the participants with
respect to the initiation and consultation phase, from Professor
Bognetti's view that the executive is best suited to impart the impetus; to
Lord Templeman's advocacy for enhanced parliamentary participation,
tempered by attention to the risk that bringing parliament in too early
may jeopardize a successful conclusion; to Professor Cottier who believes
that the parliament should be consulted at an early stage on the broad
principles of negotiation so that it is more receptive to the ultimate work
of the negotiators. Unquestionably there is merit to all of these ideas.
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By concentrating early attention on broad principles, the parliament
may avoid falling into a quagmire. In light of the demanding workload
confronting modern parliamentarians and their staffs, they may well pre-
fer to concentrate on details only after a draft text has emerged. The
structure of the international system will continue to make it difficult for
parliaments to interact with each other expeditiously so as to assure that
the treaty is in fact made. There remains a need for each nation to be able
to represent its view with a focused voice, and a logical choice for that
voice is the executive.
B. The Conclusion Phase
1. Approval
The parliament in each surveyed country plays a role in approving
the conclusion of treaties, other than agreements in simplified form (or
executive agreements).3 ' In the Netherlands and United Kingdom ap-
proval by the Parliament is assumed if a motion to consider the treaty is
not made in the Parliament prior to the expiration of a waiting period. 32
In other states the approval is by act of the parliamentary body, while
only in the United States is one chamber of a bicameral legislature enti-
tled to approve treaties.33
Professor Trimble suggested that in the United States the full Con-
gress should play a much more active role in the treaty-making process
in its entirety, since treaties directly affect individual interests even in
such areas as arms control. He strongly advocated moving away from the
Article II treaty approval process and into a full congressional approval
process, seeing no modern justification either for continuing Senate pri-
macy in treaty matters or, conversely, for excluding the House of Repre-
sentatives from such matters.
31. Regarding executive agreements with respect to the United States, see Riesenfeld & Abbott,
supra note 3, at 635-36. The term "agreement in simplified form" refers to a broad species of inter-
governmental agreement concluded without the involvement of parliament, although there are of
course substantial nation to nation differences with respect to the context in which such agreements
may be used, see, e.g., Soares, supra note 14, at 503-08; Bognetti, supra note 11, at 397-400. The
constitutions of a number of the states represented at the symposium set forth a list of subject matter,
treaties as to which require express approval, see, e.g. Luchaire, supra note 11, at 347; Frowein &
Hahn, supra note 8, at 358-68. In Switzerland treaties regarding adherence to supranational organi-
zations and to organizations for collective security are subject to compulsory referendum. Certain
other categories of treaty are subject to optional referendum, see Wildhaber, supra note 11, at 441-
42.
32. In the Netherlands pursuant to a constitutional provision, see van Dijk & Tahzib, supra
note 13, at 426-28. In the United Kingdom pursuant to the Ponsonby Rule, see Templeman, supra,
note 12, at 465-66.
33. The factors which distinguish the English and German situations are discussed, supra notes
9 and 15.
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Professor Glennon objected to the idea that a change in the treaty-
making process in the United States should be undertaken simply be-
cause scholars have concluded that it is undemocratic. In his view the
Article II system has worked reasonably well and the notion that the
Senate has been a graveyard for treaties is exaggerated. If the Article II
process is to be changed, Professor Glennon believes this must be accom-
plished through a constitutional amendment so as to foster respect for
the rule of law.
As we have stated in our paper, we believe that the decision whether
to submit a treaty for approval to the Senate or the Congress should
remain left to the wisdom of the Executive, as is permitted by the
Constitution.
2. Conditions to Approval
According to international law, unless a treaty provides otherwise a
nation may qualify its ratification of a treaty by entering a reservation to
one or more of its provisions. A valid and effective reservation modifies
the terms of the treaty.34 A nation may also qualify its consent to ratifica-
tion by appending an understanding or interpretative declaration with
respect to a term or terms, but an understanding is not intended to mod-
ify the terms of the treaty.3 5 In some nations the parliament may qualify
its consent to the ratification of a treaty by requiring the executive to
include a reservation or understanding or other declaration in its instru-
ment of ratification.
In each of Brazil, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the
United States, the parliament generally is recognized to have the power
to attach qualifications to its consent to ratification, but in each of these
countries with the exception of the United States the legislative branch
has qualified its consent infrequently. Opinion is divided with respect to
Argentina. Judge Ruda notes that the Argentine Congress required
treaty modifications on a number of occasions in the previous century,
but has not attempted to require a modification by amendment or reser-
vation in this century.3 6 On the other hand, the Argentine Congress has
recently required the executive to communicate interpretative statements
as an element of its consent.37 In France and the United Kingdom the
34. Reservations may be invalid or ineffective for several reasons. Matters to consider include
whether the reservation is permitted by the terms of the treaty, whether it is objected to by other
parties, and whether it is consistent with the object and purpose of the treaty. See Riesenfeld &
Abbott, supra note 3, at 586-89.
35. For a discussion of understandings and interpretative statements, see id. at 602-03.
36. See Ruda, supra note 14, at 492.
37. Id. at 492-93.
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Parliament may not qualify its consent. In Italy according to actual prac-
tice Parliament neither needs to approve reservations which the Govern-
ment has appended to its signature or intends to append to its ratification
of a treaty nor can it impose the attachment of reservations in its ap-
proval of ratification. Although conceding that Italian scholars have ex-
pressed dissenting views on both propositions,3 8 Professor Bognetti
suspects that in the rare cases where the Government included reserva-
tions in the proposed law of approval that this was done by inadvertence.
Professor Bognetti opines that the issue is closed, at least for the time
being. Among the European states there have been a few recent and im-
portant cases, such as that involving the German parliament's approval
of agreements with Poland,3 9 in which action initiated by the parliament
to qualify its consent to a treaty may have had a significant effect on
international relations. 40
The U.S. Senate is the most active legislative body with respect to
the formal adoption of qualifications on consent to ratification. As we
point out in our paper, between 1970 and 1987 the Senate included quali-
fications in its consent to the ratification of 33 of the 221 treaties (or 17.5
percent) it approved during that period. More important, in the past sev-
eral years the Senate has added qualifications on the approval of adher-
ence to major multilateral human rights treaty commitments.4 ' U.S.
reservations have been the subject of numerous objections by foreign
states, 42 and while only the passage of time will permit an empirical eval-
uation of the impact of U.S. practice on the evolution of the treaty sys-
tem, widespread adoption of U.S. practices such as reserving the
supremacy of its Constitution may well undermine the creation of an
effective system of treaty-based individual rights.43
A recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights, Belilos
38. See, e.g., recently, VICENZO LIPPOLis, LA CONSTITUZIONE ITALIANA E LA FORMAZIONE
DEi TRArrATI INTERNAZIONALE 107-16 (1989) (cited by Professor Bognetti).
39. See Frowein & Hahn, supra note 8, at 378-81.
40. In Germany and Switzerland, for example, the executive may propose reservations or inter-
pretative statements to alleviate the concerns of parliament with regard to the rights of components
of the federal system, i.e. the Lander and the cantons. See id. at 365-66; Wildhaber, supra note 11, at
452, 456-57.
41. Namely the recent conditions respecting adherence to the Genocide, Torture, and Civil and
Political Rights Conventions.
42. See Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 3, regarding in particular the Torture and Genocide
Conventions.
43. Although international law tolerates the use of reservations and understandings, a substan-
tial increase in the frequency of their use might well give rise to an unwieldy, if not unworkable,
multilateral treaty regime. Much criticism of the current GATT arrangement, for example, centers
on the use of side agreements which have the effect of creating different sets of rules applicable to
GATI contracting parties. See, e.g., JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 52 (1989).
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v. Switzerland,44 emphasized an important dimension regarding the law
relating to treaty reservations. In this case the Court decided that a Swiss
reservation to the European Convention on Human Rights45 that was
not permitted by the Convention because of its general character s would
not be given legal effect. The Court decided further that the Convention
and the provision as to which the reservation was made remained in force
as to Switzerland without the subject reservation. Although this decision
might appear to be a novelty in international law, the Court did not elab-
orate the basis for its decision. Therefore we were particularly fortunate
to have Professor Wildhaber, who argued the case for Switzerland before
the Court, and Professor Frowein, who represented the European Com-
mission of Human Rights before the Court, share their views with us.
Professors Wildhaber and Frowein agreed that the European Court
probably considered that the European Convention on Human Rights is
an "integration" mechanism and that this distinguishes it from an ordi-
nary multilateral treaty. 47 Professor Frowein believes that the rule that
an invalid reservation must lead either to invalidity of adherence or disre-
gard of the treaty provision as to which the reservation is made is mani-
festly contrary to the purposes of an integration treaty.4" Professor
Frowein pointed out that if a treaty provision as to which an invalid
reservation is made is disregarded, then the reserving party achieves the
same end with an invalid reservation as it would with a valid reserva-
tion-namely, the provision reserved to would not be applied.
Professor Wildhaber stressed that there was a historical point when
it was appropriate to permit reservations to integration treaties in order
to encourage adherence to them. This historical rationale is perhaps no
longer valid. Professor Frowein was critical of the European Convention
on Human Rights for permitting reservations from its very beginning.
As noted, in the Belilos case it was held that the Swiss qualification
to its adherence was invalid as a reservation of a general character in
contravention of article 64 of the European Convention on Human
Rights. Professor Wildhaber observed that while the Swiss government
44. 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988). See discussion at Wildhaber, supra note 11, at 453-57;
Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 3, at 588-89.
45. The Swiss had denominated their qualification as an interpretative declaration, but the
Court recharacterized it as a reservation. See infra text accompanying note 49.
46. Reservations of a general nature are expressly prohibited by the European Convention. See
infra text accompanying note 49.
47. Professor Wildhaber also suggested that the Court may have drawn a distinction between
treaties with "objective effect," such as human rights treaties, and "reciprocal" treaties.
48. Professor Wildhaber mentioned that he had not pressed the idea of invalidating Swiss ad-
herence to the treaty before the Court because this was not a result to be encouraged, and with-
drawal would in any event be considered afterwards by the Swiss public.
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had argued that a reservation of a general character meant a reservation
that was directed at more than one article of the Convention, the Com-
mission and Court took the position that because the reservation had
been intended to affect a broad segment of Swiss criminal and civil proce-
dure, it was of a general character.49
The Belilos decision is important in regard to the U.S. practice of
attaching reservations to important multilateral human rights treaties,
particularly reservations asserting the supremacy of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. If an international or national tribunal finds that such a reservation
is inconsistent with the object and purpose of a treaty, for instance be-
cause it undermines the establishment of consistent rules, such tribunal
may look to Belilos for support in disregarding the reservation and apply-
ing the treaty to the United States in toto.
C. The Operation Phase
1. Self-execution and override
When a self-executing treaty comes into force it may for some na-
tions become legally operative in the domestic legal order without addi-
tional legislative action, and in other states it may become internally
operative only upon the enactment of implementing legislation. Whether
or not implementing legislation is required is a question answered by the
domestic constitution in each state. As we discussed in Part I of this
foreword, among the countries surveyed in this symposium, only the
United Kingdom precludes treaties from having direct domestic effect
prior to implementation by legislation. In the Netherlands and France,
the parliament may not adopt subsequent legislation to override the
terms of a treaty, and therefore may not modify its self-executing charac-
ter. In all other countries represented in the symposium, the legislature
may override a treaty for domestic purposes by enacting inconsistent leg-
islation, and may thereby transform its self-executing character.50 Only
in the United States does a single chamber of an otherwise bicameral
49. In Professor Wildhaber's view, the Swiss position was weakened by the fact that at the time
the reservation was entered, the Swiss had not compiled a list of the statutes to which it would be
applicable, reinforcing the notion that the Swiss were painting with a broad brush.
Professor Frowein suggested that perhaps in 1974 when the Swiss formulated their condition as
an interpretative declaration they knew full well that the Convention would not permit a reservation
of the sort they were attempting to make, and that the Swiss had taken a subtle approach to accom-
plishing their purpose. He observed that the Turkish government had denominated certain of its
conditions of adherence to the Convention as interpretative declarations, expressly adding that the
Convention organs would determine their effect. He suggested that the Turkish government was also
well aware that it could not validly make reservations of the kind it attempted to make by interpreta-
tive declarations.
50. Only with respect to Germany and the United States were we apprised of circumstances in
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legislative body assert the power to convert a self-executing treaty to a
non-self-executing treaty.51 In all countries surveyed in which a treaty
may have direct effect, it is the courts which decide whether a treaty is
self-executing, though the parliament, except in France and the Nether-
lands, may through legislation control this determination.
2. Interpretation
We also discussed, in Part I above, the issue of control by the parlia-
ment over interpretation. With the exception of the view of the U.S. Sen-
ate and the unfortunate dicta in United States v. Stuart, for none of the
countries represented in the symposium has it been suggested that the
legislative record with respect to consent to treaty ratification takes pre-
cedence over the materials which would otherwise establish its meaning
under international law.
3. Checks and Balances
In a parliamentary democracy the legislative branch generally may
bring down the government through a vote of no confidence or censure.52
Of course by such censure or threat of censure the executive may be re-
strained in the implementation of a treaty. In parliamentary democracies,
the parliament generally controls the budget and in doing so can bring
considerable pressure to bear on the executive with respect to treaty im-
plementation. A budgetary threat need not involve the treaty matter in
issue. There are, of course, innumerable other ways in which the legisla-
tive and executive branches interact on an ongoing basis. Thus to facili-
tate the accomplishment of its own programs the executive should
generally be restrained from ignoring with impunity important parlia-
mentary demands. Perhaps for this reason it is only rarely that the execu-
tive comes into conflict with the parliament in respect to a matter of
treaty operation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our friend and colleague Myres McDougal wrote in 1952:
Enough creative comparative studies have been made to ... suggest
that the method can be used to clarify the values of the peoples of the
world ... for demonstrating the deep underlying equivalences in their
demands for the values of a free society.... for increasing the identifi-
which the legislative body or a single chamber has converted or purported to convert a self-executing
treaty into a non-self-executing treaty.
51. See discussion with respect to Germany and the United Kingdom, supra notes 9 and 15.
52. See, e.g., Luchaire, supra note 11, at 354.
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cation of all free peoples with each other, and for in general establish-
ing the consensus and predispositions necessary to effective
cooperation in whatever forms of organization may be most appropri-
ate under contemporary conditions. . . . Certainly no other method
promises more in the invention and adaptation of felicitous alterna-
tives, doctrines and procedures, for the achievement of our emerging
goals, whether world, regional, national, or local. 53
We hope you will share our feeling that this symposium has helped to
clarify and illuminate some important issues of constitutional and inter-
national law. Our primary motivation was to call attention to and ad-
dress the regrettable practices of the U.S. Senate in attempting to
determine the non-self-executing character of treaties and asserting the
power to interpret them with binding internal effect. We hope that this
symposium will assist in persuading the courts that the Senate does not
have the constitutional power to accomplish these objectives. We stress
that these are not mere technical issues, but rather go to the fundamental
problem of assuring democratic participation in the national and interna-
tional legal order.
We are extremely grateful to all of the participants who contributed
such fine papers, and to those other individuals who contributed to the
success of our meeting. We thank the Graduate Institute of International
Studies in Geneva, Switzerland for allowing us to use their beautiful fa-
cilities for our meeting. We especially thank Professor Lucius Caflisch
for helping us make this arrangement. We are most grateful to our finan-
cial sponsors: the Chicago-based law firms, Baker & McKenzie and
Keck, Mahin & Cate, as well as the Chicago-Kent College of Law. We
gratefully acknowledge the assistance of several fine research assistants at
Chicago-Kent: Allyson Harris, Laura Finnegan, Micky Forbes, Janis
Marzuki and Jamie Sypulski. Finally, our thanks to the editors of the
Law Review for their dedication and hard work.
A hardbound version of this symposium will be published by Marti-
nus Nijhoff Publishers. This book will include a transcript of the Geneva
meeting, as well as various supplementary materials and finding aids.
53. Myres S. McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification
as an Instrument of Democratic World Order, 1 AM. J. COMp. L. 24, 34-35 (1952).
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